Combatting Skepticism Against Religious Nationalism

Full thesis: Combatting Skepticism Against Religious Nationalism (Joseph Wharton Scholars)

Religious nationalism, especially in today’s day and age, is generally considered detrimental for society. It has been deemed a perverted form of secular nationalism in most mainstream literary works by scholars who study political science and theory, with the general belief being that the added influence of religion in nationalism makes it take a turn for the worse. In 2021, I wrote an undergraduate thesis for the Joseph Wharton Scholars program looking at whether that belief holds up. I argued that although on the surface it appears that the “religious” element of religious nationalism leads to conflict, violence, and societal collapse, religion is not the sole, or perhaps even the primary, factor that leads to these outcomes. The problems that arise in societies where elements of religious nationalism are present come about as a byproduct of nationalism itself, not religious nationalism specifically. Nationalism, whether religious or secular, is a source of inherent instability and is bound to lead to complications of one kind or another if left unchecked.

Religious nationalism is on the rise around the globe. In some cases its rise is very explicit, for example in India’s case with the Hindutva movement. In other cases, the involvement of religious nationalist elements may not be as explicit. A prominent example of this is the involvement of Christian nationalism in the recent anti-immigration wave in the United States. There have also been cases where religious nationalism has given rise to, or led to an increase in, communal violence, including radical Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar and the persecution of Rohingya Muslims. In a world where the largest democracy, India, and the country with the strongest economy, the United States, are experiencing an uptick in religious nationalism, it is imperative to better understand whether or not it is truly detrimental to society because of religion.

What follows is a condensed version of that thesis.

Defining the terms

Nationalism is, at its very core, a word. That sounds simplistic on its own, but it is important to recognize this fact, because nationalism is not a phenomenon that can be defined through empirical means. It is not something that can be observed in the natural world, which makes the task a definitional one, not an empirical one. As a result, the word has been defined in myriad ways, with most definitions varying based on the context in which they are used. Following Giovanni Sartori’s advice, I looked at these different definitions and tried to isolate the core concepts underlying each of them, then determined what definition works best in the context of this argument.

A nation, as it is loosely understood today, refers to a group of people united by some common factor and by the desire to control a territory thought of as the group’s national homeland. That common factor can include heritage, culture, myths, language, and in some cases religion. A state, on the other hand, refers to the political and territorial structures that house a population, including a sovereign government within specific borders. Combining these two ideas gives rise to the nation-state: a sovereign state governed for the sake of a single, homogenous nation. For a working definition of a nation, I used Anthony Smith’s: a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all members.

There are two common approaches to defining nationalism. The first considers nationalism to be an idea or a belief. The second considers it to be a process. Across both categories, two key features appear especially prominent. The first is that almost all nationalisms define a set of territorial boundaries that a nation should have the right to control. The second focuses on the boundaries for the nation itself, that is, the criteria an individual needs to fulfil to be considered a member of the nation. Jonathan Hearn’s definition applies well here. Nationalism is “the making of combined claims, on behalf of a population, to identity, to jurisdiction and to territory.”

Religious nationalism is harder to pin down because the general assumption today is that nationalism is a secular phenomenon. When religion is mixed with nationalism, the end result is often considered a perversion of nationalism. That idea stems from the belief that religion is something personal and should remain out of the public sphere. When religion starts playing an active role in nationalism, people draw the conclusion that the end results will not be good for society. One implicit assumption in this line of reasoning is that nationalism is modern and progressive while religion is something of the past. Mark Juergensmeyer, at the forefront of this modernist view, treats religious nationalism and secular nationalism as competing ideologies, with secular nationalism preferred in every case.

I do not agree with this line of reasoning as it is overly simplistic. Secular nationalisms still use cultural, religious, and ethnic resources to help build a sense of belonging. Carlton Hayes goes further and argues that secular nationalism can be thought of as a religion in and of itself, given the determination of people to subordinate all other human loyalties to national loyalty. Anthony Smith, as Brubaker notes, has described nationalism as a religion both in a substantive sense, insofar as it entails a quest for a kind of this-worldly collective “salvation,” and in a functional sense, insofar as it involves a system of beliefs and practices that distinguishes the sacred from the profane and unites its adherents in a single moral community. At a basic level, both demand utmost loyalty toward one entity, and both have a system of beliefs and symbols that connect their followers. That is why the argument that religious nationalism is simply a perverted form of secular nationalism does not make logical sense.

Brubaker concludes that there are essentially four ways to look at the relationship between religion and nationalism: religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena; religion as a cause or explanation of nationalism; religion as intertwined with nationalism; and religious nationalism as a distinctive kind of nationalism. Different moments in the history of the Indian subcontinent fit different cases. There is a high degree of nuance involved in analyzing religious nationalism, so simply labeling it as a distorted form of secular nationalism would be unjust.

Critiquing arguments against religious nationalism

Much of the opposition to religious nationalism is not directed solely at nationalism that draws its sense of nationhood from religious roots. In fact, the opposition often starts from religion itself. Marx famously said that religion is the opium of the people. Freud compared religion to a childhood neurosis. Rupert Emerson expected secular nationalism to leave its Western confines and take over the world. Jawaharlal Nehru’s claim that “there is no going back” to segregating and differentiating based on religious beliefs captures the same confidence that modernity and secularism were the only ways forward.

Against that backdrop, I looked at four main lines of argument put forth by critics of religious nationalism, and then offered counterarguments. In each case, either the history is oversimplified or religion is blamed for vices that can be traced back to nationalism itself.

1. Religious nationalists have not “modernized” enough

Perhaps the most salient argument against religious nationalism is the idea that religion’s active presence in the public sphere is a relic of the past. From the early 1600s onwards, societies in Europe started experiencing a shift in how they governed themselves. The church started losing power, and a secular national culture became the underlying unifying factor. This process is heralded as a great step toward modernization. Scholars who criticize religious nationalism relegate it to a perverted form of secular nationalism and argue that Eastern attachment to religion in public life often amounts to retaliation against the West rather than a serious evaluation of secular models.

The core of this argument uses the Enlightenment as a foundation. But prominent Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, Kant, and Hume did not categorically state that all religion was evil and should be completely removed from all facets of life. Deism, the form of religion most closely associated with the Enlightenment, still affirmed that the universe was created by a supreme intelligence, while insisting that we rely on our own reasoning rather than miracles or special revelations. Even more importantly, the hallmark of the Enlightenment was a commitment to rationality, and secular nationalism does not appear to be any more rational than religious nationalism. Scholars using Enlightenment separation to prefer secular nationalism need to be cognizant of the fact that these same thinkers would not automatically support nationalism either.

It is also important to understand the geographic origins of the Enlightenment. Within Christianity itself, Western Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy gave rise to different church-state relationships. Separating church and state in the West was not as monumental a task as attempting it where Islam treats Sharia as the supreme law of the land. Even in regions that gave birth to the Enlightenment, religion is still very much present in the public sphere. As Wuthnow argues, it is always around us; we are not as good at seeing it as we might think.

Using a Western model of separation and stating that it be enforced in the East, without considering that the nature of the church-state relationship there is very different, propagates to a certain degree the same kind of thinking that once justified colonial civilizing missions. Collectivist cultures in much of the East, supported by religious teachings across a variety of faiths, also stand in contrast to the individualistic culture common in most Western states. Religious nationalists are not simply retaliating against the West. In many cases they are trying to preserve their way of life. In places that lived under colonial rule, religious institutions often operated with relative independence from the colonial state and frequently struggled against it. Wanting to return to a prior way of life after foreign rule is understandable. To view it simply as hatred of Western teachings is an oversimplification.

Secularization might lead to better outcomes for some nations. But given the nature of the church-state relationship in the East, especially in majority Muslim states, presenting it as something that can simply be adopted on Europe’s timetable does not take societal, cultural, and historical differences seriously enough.

2. Religion gives those in power authority to declare when violence is moral

Religion, especially in the case of the Abrahamic religions, has frequently resorted to violence to expand its following and solidify its stronghold. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian Orthodox Church discouraged dialogue and peaceful measures and framed violent conflict against Muslims as a religious duty. Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, who played a role in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, described Islam as a religion of warfare and treated jihad as actual violent conflict. Juergensmeyer’s conversations with Sikh fighters after the martyrdom of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale show a similar fusion of political and religious commitment. Armstrong makes the broader claim that religious leaders glorify violence and push followers to commit violent acts for a sacred cause.

These arguments are based on sound factual evidence. Religious nationalism in regions such as the Middle East, India, and Bosnia-Herzegovina has indeed led to violent episodes and, in some cases, the persecution of religious minorities. The harder question is whether these acts of violence were a result of religion or nationalism. I argue that it is the latter. I do not mean that all nationalism leads to violence. But the inherent “othering” that comes about as a direct result of nationalism, regardless of whether it happens across religious, cultural, or ethnic lines, is what leads to such episodes.

Secular nationalism can give rise to episodes of violence at least as severe. The Rwandan genocide was motivated by ethnic nationalism. Belgian colonial classifications, Tutsi privilege, Hutu resentment, exile politics, and decades of cyclical violence culminated in the massacre of about a million people and the rape of an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 women over the course of about a hundred days. The Holocaust is often the first example people think of when presented with the word genocide. While it was carried out against a group identified by their faith, it was not perpetrated by individuals motivated by religion. Hitler was critical of religion in general and considered Christianity a religion fit only for slaves. What fueled the massacre was the sense of superiority that nationalism can instill within a group of people. Cambodia, Armenia, and Bangladesh in 1971 point in the same direction. In all these cases, those carrying out or supporting the massacres were led to believe that it was their moral duty to do so. Religion should not be blamed for the violence that erupts through religious nationalism. It is the nature of nationalism that motivates people to engage in such acts.

3. Religious nationalism promotes one religion above all else

This line of argument makes intuitive sense. Religious nationalism is based on the belief that a certain religion is the true religion and should guide the public and private lives of the nation’s members. If a religious nationalist movement achieves its goals, other religions are likely to be considered secondary or inferior. This can be seen through Hindutva in India, the Islamization of Zia’s Pakistan, the atrocities committed against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, and Sinhalese Buddhist claims of superiority in Sri Lanka. Although many of the scriptures and teachings for these religions preach nonviolence and harmony, those teachings often matter less when religion is infused with nationalism.

Of the four lines of argument, this is perhaps the easiest to counter. What critics find detestable about religious nationalism is the foundation of nationalism itself. To make combined claims to identity, jurisdiction, and territory, a population relies on something that brings it together. In the case of religious nationalism, that something is religion. Naturally, when this something brings a group of people together, others will be excluded. Similar patterns of othering exist in nearly every form of nationalism.

Juergensmeyer refers to religious and secular nationalisms as “ideologies of order.” In both, one is expected to submit to an ordering agent, whether the state or a divine entity, and not doing so results in the individual being alienated or othered. The Rwandan example shows how one ethnicity deemed itself superior to others. Another example is what Pandey and Samad term the “Punjabistan of Pakistan.” Punjab’s demographic weight, political overrepresentation, and military dominance create a provincial nationalism that undermines those who do not come from Punjab. This othering of non-Punjabis proved pivotal in the separation of East Pakistan in 1971 and continues to fuel insurgency in Balochistan. To argue that religious nationalism has a concerning pattern of relegating those with different beliefs to an inferior position is a critique of nationalism, not religion.

4. Religious leaders cling to power and prevent secularization

Critics argue that religious nationalist leaders in the East have influence they do not wish to lose, and that this prevents those nations from adopting a model of secular nationalism. Most of the states in this category were colonized by a Western European country at some point. While colonial administrations were in charge of most public institutions, religious institutions continued to operate independently. After those administrations departed, religious institutions often had some of the nation’s most effective systems of communication, and religious leaders were often more devoted, efficient, and intelligent than government officials. India’s Nehru-Gandhi lineage tried to develop secular Indian nationalism and still had to make concessions to religious groups. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikh nationalists. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by Tamil nationalists amid another conflict involving nationalist and religious dimensions. Elsewhere, as Hibbard notes, mainstream political elites have helped normalize exclusivist religious ideologies and bring them into the political mainstream. Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization in Pakistan is a clear example.

The underlying assumption here, similar to the first argument, is that a Eurocentric view of modernization built on the Enlightenment is the ideal scenario to which a state should aspire. Simply supplanting existing political and social structures in the East with those from the West, without taking into account the process Western states went through and the differences between them and the Eastern states in question, is a flawed strategy. Most mainstream religions with mass followings today originated in Asia or Africa. By virtue of being the birthplace of these religions, removing religion from the public sphere is a great undertaking, because religious practices, symbols, and heritages are deeply ingrained in society. Anti-Westernism in these movements is also not unique to religious leaders. It can be seen within the common populace as well.

Nor is the desire for power unique to religious nationalism. Azerbaijan is useful here because it cuts against the stereotype. Despite an overwhelmingly Muslim population, a secular nationalist elite first forged a distinct Azerbaijani identity in 1918. After independence from the Soviet Union, the country chose to remain secular rather than turn into a Muslim state. Where religious leaders do take and keep power after colonization, they usually do so because of the support they receive from the masses. If a majority of the population disagreed with them, they would not have been able to take control so easily. Blaming a handful of leaders for single-handedly blocking secularization ignores that base. Similar power-seeking appears in ethnic nationalism in Rwanda and in Nazi Germany. The desire to be in power and complete control is commonplace within nationalist movements in general.

British India and Pakistan

Looking at British India and post-1947 Pakistan allows for a deeper look at how religious nationalism can evolve in one region over time and how it can have both positive and negative consequences.

In British India, modern nationalism grew under colonization. Oppressive policy changes without Indian representation produced an us versus them situation and evoked nationalistic sentiments. The introduction of Western education in the Indian middle class was one of the main factors leading to a rise of nationalism. The creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 brought Indian nationalism into the political arena, while the belief amongst mainstream Muslim politicians that Congress valued Hindu interests more than Muslim interests introduced religious divide into the mix. British divide and rule strategies, including splitting the army by nationality, caste, and religion and partitioning Bengal in 1905, eventually backfired into stronger nationalist sentiment even as they sharpened communal lines.

By 1947, religion clearly mattered to partition, though scholars still disagree about the extent to which it was solely religion. What matters for this argument is the sequence. Leading up to independence, despite rising religious nationalism, there are no major examples of violence erupting on the basis of religion that match the signature failures critics attribute to religious nationalism. Hindus and Muslims had a cordial relationship even though the latter wanted a separate state. Gandhi and Jinnah both believed in the importance of secular politics despite having strong religious beliefs. Thus, religious nationalism proved beneficial for Indians in gaining independence from the British Raj. It was not only a pathology.

After 1947, Pakistan’s story is different. Ethnic nationalism among Pakhtuns, Balochis, Sindhis, Bengalis, and later Mohajirs proved that Islam alone was not strong enough to overcome every cleavage. East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971. At the same time, religion shifted roles. The institution that had served as a divisive force before 1947 now served as a unifying force among ethnic groups with unique cultures, traditions, languages, and histories. Religious leaders, most of whom were initially opposed to the creation of Pakistan, started calling for complete Islamization of the state. Liberal politicians of the All-India Muslim League resisted and largely failed. After 1971, Pakistan turned away from South Asia and developed deeper ties with the Muslim Middle East. Religion and nationalism were used repeatedly by religious, military, and liberal leaders alike to legitimize their rule.

The same religious nationalism that did not give rise to the kinds of incidents critics highlight before 1947 later helped lead Pakistan down a darker route. Before 1947, Muslim religious nationalism was tied to the belief that Muslims should have their own state where they would not be oppressed and could practice their faith freely. After independence, the sense of superiority and the element of othering that nationalism brings with it had already seeped into society. Sunni majoritarianism and Punjabi provincial dominance offered new ways to draw the line between us and them. Bhutto’s use of emotive religious phrases to appeal to the public, followed by Zia’s Islamization, set a dangerous precedent: siding with radical religious nationalist groups results in a great increase in one’s support and voter base. Public support for these ideas of superiority makes the problem harder than a story about a few fanatics. Recent episodes involving TLP-led violence and pressure on Pakistan’s EU trade preferences over blasphemy laws show how nationalism left unchecked can threaten the state’s standing and its own people.

The single most important takeaway from this case is that nationalism can lead a nation and its people down an endless cycle of violence and othering. The same group of people that rallied around the desire for religious freedom and demanded a country where they would not be oppressed turned into the oppressors themselves. This shift happened as soon as they went from being a minority, Indian Muslims, to being Pakistani Muslims, an overwhelming majority. When the old minority-majority frame disappeared inside an overwhelmingly Muslim state, religious and ethnic markers were reinvented to keep superiority intelligible. Radicalization does not come about as a result of any specific form of nationalism. It is nationalism itself that radicalizes groups of people by instilling within them the belief that they are superior to those around them, often without any rational foundation.

What I took away

In conclusion, there are four essential arguments that critics of religious nationalism propose. First, that religious nationalism is a less ideal, perverted form of secular nationalism because nations in the East have not modernized enough to rely on a rational compact rather than religion. The flaw here is the assumption that secularization is synonymous with modernization and that the Western model can simply be transported eastward. Second, that religion gives those in power the authority to declare when violence is moral. This idea of violence and othering is not unique to religious nationalism. It is a defining characteristic of nationalism itself. Third, that religious nationalism promotes one religion above all else. This, yet again, is a characteristic of nationalism itself. Fourth, that religious nationalist leaders cling to power and block secularization. These leaders generally have overwhelming support from people who derive their sense of identity from religious beliefs. The claim that they are single-handedly hampering progress toward secularization is simply not true.

The Pakistani case shows both the positive and negative sides of the ledger. Religious nationalism helped a colonized people claim political freedom. It also, once victory rearranged who counted as majority and minority, helped justify new hierarchies. If a state wishes to maintain its integrity and effectively combat these negative effects of nationalism, it is imperative not to give concessions to groups that already exhibit the patterns of othering, superiority, and non-negotiation described above. Once they are given a platform and a voice, nationalist groups are very hard to contain afterward.

Which forms of nationalism are justified in which contexts is a separate question, and it was outside the scope of the thesis. The narrower claim is the one I still stand by. Those who find religious nationalism less ideal than secular nationalism fail to see that the vices within religious nationalism are a direct result of nationalism itself, not religion.